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Abstract
Monte-Carlo counterfactual regret minimization
(MCCFR) is the state-of-the-art algorithm for solv-
ing sequential games that are too large for full tree
traversals. It works by using gradient estimates
that can be computed via sampling. However,
stochastic methods for sequential games have not
been investigated extensively beyond MCCFR.
In this paper we develop a new framework for
developing stochastic regret minimization meth-
ods. This framework allows us to use any regret-
minimization algorithm, coupled with any gradi-
ent estimator. The MCCFR algorithm can be ana-
lyzed as a special case of our framework, and this
analysis leads to significantly-stronger theoretical
guarantees on convergence, while simultaneously
yielding a simplified proof. Our framework allows
us to instantiate several new stochastic methods
for solving sequential games. We show extensive
experiments on three games, where some variants
of our methods outperform MCCFR.
1. Introduction
Extensive-form games (EFGs) are a broad class of games
that can model sequential and simultaneous moves, out-
come uncertainty, and imperfect information. This includes
real-world settings such as negotiation, sequential auctions,
security games (Lisý et al., 2016; Munoz de Cote et al.,
2013), cybersecurity games (DeBruhl et al., 2014; Chen
et al., 2018), recreational games such as poker (Sandholm,
2010) and billiards (Archibald & Shoham, 2009), and med-
ical treatment (Chen & Bowling, 2012). Typically, EFG
models are operationalized by computing either a Nash
equilibrium of the game, or an approximate Nash equilib-
rium if the game is large. Approximate Nash equilibrium
of zero-sum EFGs has been the underlying idea of several
recent AI milestones, where superhuman AIs for two-player
poker were created (Moravcˇík et al., 2017; Brown & Sand-
holm, 2017). In principle, a zero-sum EFG can be solved
in polynomial time using a linear program whose size is
linear in the size of the game tree (von Stengel, 1996). How-
ever, for most real-world games this linear program is much
too large to solve, either because it does not fit in memory,
or because iterations of the simplex algorithm or interior-
point methods become prohibitively expensive due to matrix
inversion. Instead, gradient-based methods are used in prac-
tice (Zinkevich et al., 2007; Hoda et al., 2010; Tammelin
et al., 2015; Brown & Sandholm, 2019a; Kroer et al., 2020).
These methods work by only keeping one or two strategies
around for each player (typically the size of a strategy is
much smaller than the size of the game tree). The game
tree is then only accessed for computing gradients, which
can be done via a single tree traversal that does not require
an explicit tree representation, and sometimes game struc-
ture can be exploited to speed this up further (Johanson
et al., 2011). Finally, these gradients are used to update the
strategy iterates.
However, eventually even these gradient-based methods
that require traversing the entire game tree become too ex-
pensive (henceforth referred to as deterministic methods).
This was seen in two recent superhuman poker AIs: Li-
bratus (Brown & Sandholm, 2017) and Pluribus (Brown &
Sandholm, 2019b). Both AIs were generated in a two-stage
manner: an offline blueprint strategy was computed, and
then refinements to the blueprint solution were computed
online while playing against the human players. The online
solutions were computed using deterministic methods (as
the subgames are much smaller). However, the original
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blueprint strategies had to be computed without traversing
the entire game tree, as this game tree is far too large for
even a moderate amount of traversals.
When full tree traversals are too expensive, stochastic meth-
ods can be used to compute approximate gradients instead.
The most popular stochastic method for solving EFGs is
the Monte-Carlo Counterfactual Regret Minimization (MC-
CFR) algorithm (Lanctot et al., 2009). MCCFR combines
the CFR algorithm (Zinkevich et al., 2007) with various
stochastic gradient estimators. Variations of this algorithm
were used in both Libratus and Pluribus for computing
the blueprint strategy. Follow-up papers have been written
on MCCFR, investigating various methods for improving
the sampling schemes used in estimating gradients and so
on (Gibson et al., 2012; Schmid et al., 2019). However,
beyond the MCCFR setting, stochastic methods have not
been studied extensively for solving EFGs1.
In this paper we develop a general framework for devel-
oping stochastic regret-minimization methods for solving
EFGs. In particular, we introduce a way to combine any
regret-minimizing algorithm with any gradient estimator,
and obtain high-probability bounds on the performance of
the resulting combined algorithm. As a first application of
our approach, we show that with probability 1−p, the regret
in MCCFR is at most O(
√
log(1/p)) worse off than that of
CFR, an exponential improvement over the bound O(
√
1/p)
currently known in the literature. Secondly, our approach
enables us to develop a slew of other stochastic methods for
solving EFGs. As an example of this, we instantiate follow-
the-regularized-leader (FTRL) and online mirror descent
(OMD) using our framework. We then provide extensive
numerical simulations on four diverse games, showing that
it is possible to beat MCCFR in several of the games using
our new methods. Because of the flexibility and modularity
of our approach, it paves the way for many potential fu-
ture investigations into stochastic methods for EFGs, either
via better gradient estimators, or via better deterministic
regret minimization methods that can now be converted into
stochastic methods, or both.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Two-Player Zero-Sum Extensive-Form Games
In this subsection we introduce the notation that we will use
in the rest the paper when dealing with two-player zero-sum
extensive-form games.
An extensive-form game is played on a tree rooted at a node
r. Each node v in the tree belongs to a player from the set
1Kroer et al. (2015) studies the stochastic mirror prox algorithm
for EFGs, but it is not the primary focus of the paper, and seems to
be more of a preliminary investigation.
{1, 2, c}, where c is called the chance player. The chance
player plays actions from a fixed distribution known to
Player 1 and 2, and it is used as a device to model stochastic
events such as drawing a random card from a deck. We de-
note the set of actions available at node v with Av . Each ac-
tion corresponds to an outgoing edges from v. Given a ∈ Av ,
we let ρ(v, a) denote the node that is reached by following
the edge corresponding to action a at node v. Nodes v such
that Av = ∅ are called leaves and represent terminal states
of the game. We denote with Z the set of leaves of the game.
Associated with each leaf z ∈ Z is a pair (u1(z), u2(z)) ∈ R2
of payoffs for Player 1 and 2, respectively. We denote with
∆ the payoff range of the game, that is the value ∆ :=
maxz∈Z max{u1(z), u2(z)}−minz∈Z min{u1(z), u2(z)}. In
this paper we are concerned with zero-sum extensive-form
games, that is games in which u1(z) = −u2(z) for all z ∈ Z.
To model private information, the set of all nodes for each
player i ∈ {1, 2, c} is partitioned into a collection Ii of
non-empty sets, called information sets. Each information
set I ∈ Ii contains nodes that Player i cannot distinguish
among. In this paper, we will only consider perfect-recall
games, that is games in which no player forgets what he or
she observed or knew earlier. Necessarily, if two nodes u
and v belong to the same information set I, the set of actions
Au and Av must be the same (or the player would be able to
tell u and v apart). So, we denote with AI the set of actions
of any node in I.
Sequences. The set of sequences for Player i, denoted Σi,
is defined as the set of all possible information set-action
pairs, plus a special element called empty sequence and
denoted ∅. Formally, Σi := {(I, a) : I ∈ Ii, a ∈ AI} ∪ {∅}.
Given a node v for Player i, we denote with σi(I) the last
information set-action pair of Player i encountered on the
path from the root to node v; if the player does not act
before v, σi(I) = ∅. It is known that in perfect-recall games
σi(u) = σi(v) for any two nodes u, v in the same information
set. For this reason, for each information set I we define
σi(I) to equal σi(v) for any v ∈ I.
Sequence-Form Strategies. A strategy for Player i ∈
{1, 2, c} is an assignment of a probability distribution over
the set of actions AI to each information set I that belongs
to Player i. In this paper, we represent strategies using their
sequence-form representation (Romanovskii, 1962; Koller
et al., 1996; von Stengel, 1996). A sequence-form strategy
for Player i is a non-negative vector z indexed over the set
of sequences Σi of that player. For each σ = (I, a) ∈ Σi, the
entry z[σ] contains the product of the probability of all the
actions that Player i takes on the path from the root of the
game tree down to action a at information set I, included. In
order for these probabilities to be consistent, it is necessary
and sufficient that z[∅] = 1 and∑
a∈AI
z[(I, a)] = z[σi(I)] ∀I ∈ Ii.
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A strategy such that exactly one action is selected with
probability 1 at each node is called a pure strategy.
We denote with X and Y the set of all sequence-form strate-
gies for Player 1 and Player 2, respectively. We denote with
c the fixed sequence-form strategy of the chance player.
For any leaf z ∈ Z, the probability that the game ends in z is
the product of the probabilities of all the actions on the path
from the root to z. Because of the definition of sequence-
form strategies, when Player 1 and 2 play according to
strategies x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , respectively, this probability is
equal to x[σ1(z)] · y[σ2(z)] · c[σc(z)]. So, Player 2’s expected
utility is computed via the trilinear map
u¯2(x,y, c) :=
∑
z∈Z
u2(z) · x[σ1(z)] · y[σ2(z)] · c[σc(z)]. (1)
Since the strategy of the chance player is fixed, the above
expression is bilinear in x and y and therefore can be ex-
pressed more concisely as u¯2(x,y) = x>A2 y, where A2 is
called the sequence-form payoff matrix of Player 2.
2.2. Regret Minimization
In this section we present the regret minimization algorithms
that we will work with. We will operate within the frame-
work of online convex optimization (Zinkevich, 2003). In
this setting, a decision maker repeatedly makes decisions
z1,z2, . . . from some convex compact set Z ⊆ Rn. After
each decision zt at time t, the decision maker faces a linear
loss zt 7→ (`t)>zt, where `t is a gradient vector in Rn.
Give zˆ ∈ Z, the regret compared to z of the regret mini-
mizer up to time T , denoted as RT (zˆ), measures the dif-
ference between the loss cumulated by the sequence of
output decisions z1, . . . , zT and the loss that would have
been cumulated by playing a fixed, time-independent deci-
sion zˆ ∈ Z. In symbols, RT (zˆ) := ∑Tt=1(`t)>(zt − zˆ). A
Hannan-consistent regret minimizer is such that the regret
compared to any zˆ ∈ Z grows sublinearly in T .
The two algorithms beyond MCCFR that we consider as-
sume access to a distance-generating function d : Z → R,
which is 1-strongly convex (wrt. some norm) and contin-
uously differentiable on the interior of Z. Furthermore
d should be such that the gradient of the convex conju-
gate ∇d(g) = arg maxz∈Z〈g,z〉 − d(z) is easy to com-
pute. From d we also construct the Bregman divergence
D(z ‖ z′) := d(z)− d(z′)− 〈∇d(z′),z − z′〉.
We will use the following two classical regret minimization
algorithms. The online mirror descent (OMD) algorithm
produces iterates according to the rule
zt+1 = arg min
z∈Z
{
〈`t,z〉+ 1
η
D(z ‖ zt)
}
. (2)
The follow the regularized leader (FTRL) algorithm pro-
duces iterates according to the rule (Shalev-Shwartz & Singer,
2007)
zt+1 = arg min
z∈Z
{〈 t∑
τ=1
`τ ,z
〉
+
1
η
d(z)
}
. (3)
OMD and FTRL satisfy regret bounds of the form
max
zˆ∈Z
RT (zˆ) ≤ 2L
√
D(z∗‖z1)T ,
where L is an upper bound on maxx∈Rn
(`t)>x
‖x‖ for all t. Here
‖ · ‖ is the norm which we measure strong convexity of d
with respect to. (see, e.g., Orabona (2019)).
2.3. Equilibrium-Finding in Extensive-Form Games
using Regret Minimization
It is known that in a two-player extensive-form game, a Nash
equilibrium (NE) is the solution to the bilinear saddle-point
problem
min
xˆ∈X
max
yˆ∈Y
xˆ>A2 yˆ.
Given a pair (x,y) ∈ X ×Y of sequence-form strategies for
the Player 1 and 2, respectively, the saddle-point gap
ξ(x,y) := max
yˆ∈Y
{x>A2 yˆ} − min
xˆ∈X
{xˆ>A2 y}
measures of how far the pair is to being a Nash equilibrium.
In particular, (x,y) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
ξ(x,y) = 0.
Regret minimizers can be used to find a sequence of points
(xt,yt) whose saddle-point gap converges to 0. The funda-
mental idea is to instantiate two regret minimizers R1 and
R2 for the sets X and Y, respectively, and let them respond
to each other in a self-play fashion using a particular choice
of loss vectors (see Figure 1).
R1
R2
`t−11
`t−12
xt
yt `t2
`t1 R1
R2
xt+1
yt+1 · · ·· · ·
Figure 1. Self-play method for computing NE in EFGs.
At each time t, the strategies xt and yt output by the regret
minimizers are used to compute the loss vectors
`t1 := A2 y
t, `t2 := −A>2 xt. (4)
Let x¯ and y¯ be the average of the strategies output by
R1 and R2, respectively, up to time T . Furthermore, let
RT1 := maxxˆ∈X RT1 (xˆ) and RT2 := maxyˆ∈Y RT2 (yˆ) be the
maximum regret cumulated by R1 and R2 against any
sequence-form strategy in X and Y, respectively. A well-
known folk lemma asserts that
ξ(x¯, y¯) ≤ (RT1 +RT2 )/T.
So, if R1 and R2 have regret that grows sublinearly, then
the strategy profile (x¯, y¯) converges to a saddle point.
3
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3. Stochastic Regret Minimization for
Extensive-Form Games
In this section we provide some key analytical tools to un-
derstand the performance of regret minimization algorithms
when gradient estimates are used instead of exact gradient
vectors. The results in this sections are complemented by
those of Section 4, where we introduce computationally
cheap gradient estimators for the purposes of equilibrium
finding in extensive-form games.
3.1. Regret Guarantees when Gradient Estimators are
Used
We start by studying how much the guarantee on the regret
degrades when gradient estimators are used instead of exact
gradient vectors. Our analysis need not assume that we
operate over extensive-form strategy spaces, so we present
our results in full generality.
Let R˜ be a deterministic regret minimizer over a convex and
compact set Z, and consider a second regret minimizer R
over the same set Z that is implemented starting from R˜ as
in Figure 2. In particular, at all times t,
• R queries the next decision zt of R˜, and outputs it;
• each gradient vector `t received by R is used by R to
compute a gradient estimate ˜`t such that
Et[ ˜`t] := E[ ˜`t | ˜`1, . . . , ˜`t−1] = `t.
(that is, the estimate in unbiased). The internal regret
minimizer R˜ is then shown ˜`t instead of `t.
R˜∼`
t ˜`t zt
R
Figure 2. Abstract regret minimizer considered in Section 3.1.
When the estimate of the gradient is very accurate (for in-
stance, it have low variance), it is reasonable to expect that
the regret RT incurred by R up to any time T is roughly
equal to the regret R˜T that is incurred by R˜, plus some
degradation term that depends on the variance of the es-
timates. We can quantify this relationship by fixing an
arbitrary u ∈ Z and introducing the discrete-time stochastic
process
dt := (`t)>(zt − u)− ( ˜`t)>(zt − u).
Since by hypothesis Et[ ˜`t] = `t and R˜ is a deterministic
regret minimizer, Et[dt] = 0 and so {dt} is a martingale
difference sequence. This martingale difference sequence
is well-known, especially in the context of bandit regret
minimization (Abernethy & Rakhlin, 2009; Bartlett et al.,
2008). Using the classical Azuma-Hoeffding concentration
inequality (Hoeffding, 1963; Azuma, 1967), we can prove
the following.
Proposition 1. Let M and M˜ be positive constants such
that |(`t)>(z − z′)| ≤ M and |( ˜`)>(z − z′)| ≤ M˜ for all
times t = 1, . . . , T and all feasible points z,z′ ∈ Z. Then,
for all p ∈ (0, 1) and all u ∈ Z,
P
[
RT (u) ≤ R˜T (u) + (M + M˜)
√
2T log
1
p
]
≥ 1− p.
Now if R˜ has regret that grows sublinearly in T , a straightfor-
ward consequence of Proposition 1 is that R is also growing
sublinearly in T with high probability.
3.2. Connection to Equilibrium Finding
We now apply the general theory of Section 3.1 for the
specific application of this paper—that is, Nash equilibrium
computation in large extensive-form games.
We start from the construction of Section 2.3. In particular,
we instantiate two deterministic regret minimizers R˜1, R˜2
and let them play strategies against each other. However,
instead of computing the exact losses `t1 and `
t
2 as in (4),
we compute their estimates ˜`t1 and ˜`
t
2 according to some
algorithm that guarantees that Et[ ˜`t1] = `
t
1 and Et[ ˜`
t
2] = `
t
2
at all times t. We will show that despite this modification,
the average strategy profile has a saddle point gap that is
guaranteed to converge to zero with high probability.
Because of the particular definition of `t1, we have that at all
times t,
max
x,x′∈X
∣∣∣(`t1)>(x− x′)∣∣∣ = max
x,x′∈X
∣∣∣(xt)>A2yt − (x′)>A2yt∣∣∣
= ∆,
where ∆ is the payoff range of the game (see Section 2.1).
(A symmetric statement holds for Player 2.) For i ∈ {1, 2},
let M˜i be positive constants such that |( ˜`ti)>(z−z′)| ≤ M˜i at
all times t = 1, . . . , T and all strategies z,z′ in the sequence-
form polytope for Player i (that is, X when i = 1 and Y
when i = 2). Using Proposition 1, we find that for all xˆ ∈ X
and yˆ ∈ Y, with probability (at least) 1− p,
T∑
t=1
(xt − xˆ)>A2 yt ≤ R˜T1 (xˆ) + (∆ + M˜1)
√
2T log
1
p
−
T∑
t=1
(xt)>A2 (yt − yˆ) ≤ R˜T2 (yˆ) + (∆ + M˜2)
√
2T log
1
p
where R˜i denotes the regret of the regret minimizer R˜i that
at each time t observes ˜`ti.
Summing the above inequality, dividing by T , and using the
union bound we obtain that, with probability at least 1− 2p,
x¯>A2 yˆ − xˆ>A2 y¯ ≤ (R˜T1 (xˆ) + R˜T2 (yˆ))/T
+ (2∆ + M˜1 + M˜2)
√
2
T
log
1
p
,
(5)
where x¯ := 1T
∑T
t=1 x
t and y¯ := 1T
∑T
t=1 y
t. Since (5)
holds for all xˆ ∈ X and yˆ ∈ Y, we obtain the following.
4
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Proposition 2. With probability at least 1− 2p,
ξ(x¯, y¯) ≤ R˜
T
1 (xˆ) + R˜
T
2 (yˆ)
T
+ (2∆ + M˜1 + M˜2)
√
2
T
log
1
p
.
If R˜1 and R˜2 have regret that is sublinear in T , then we
conclude that the saddle point gap ξ(x¯, y¯) converges to 0
with high probability like in the non-stochastic setting. So,
(x¯, y¯) converges to a saddle point over time.
4. Game-Theoretic Gradient Estimators
We complete the theory of Sections 3.1 and 3.2 by show-
ing some examples of computationally cheap gradient esti-
mators designed for game-theoretic applications. We will
illustrate how each technique can be used to construct an es-
timate ˜`t1 for the gradient `
t
1 = A2 y
t for Player 1 defined in
(4). The computation of an estimate for `t2 is symmetrical.
4.1. External Sampling
An unbiased estimator of the gradient vector `t1 = A2 y
t can
be easily constructed by independently sampling pure strate-
gies y˜t, c˜t for Player 2 and the chance player, respectively.
Indeed, as long as Et[y˜t] = yt and Et[c˜t] = c, from (1)
we have that for all x ∈ X , u¯2(x,yt, c) = Et[u¯2(x, y˜t, c˜t)].
Hence, the vector corresponding to the (random) linear func-
tion x 7→ u¯2(x, y˜t, c˜t) is an unbiased gradient estimator,
called the external sampling gradient estimator.
Since at all times t y˜t and c˜t are sequence-form strategies,
u¯2(x, y˜
t, c˜t) is lower bounded by the minimum payoff of
the game and upper bounded by the maximum payoff of
the game. Hence, for this estimator M˜ in Proposition 1 is
equal to the payoff range ∆ of the game. Substituting that
value into Proposition 2, we conclude that when the external
sampling gradient estimator is used to estimate the gradient
for both players, with probability at least 1− 2p the saddle
point gap of the average strategy profile (x¯, y¯) is
ξ(x¯, y¯) ≤ R˜
T
1 (xˆ) + R˜
T
2 (yˆ)
T
+ 4∆
√
2
T
log
1
p
. (6)
The external sampling gradient estimator, that is, the vector
corresponding to the linear function x 7→ u¯2(x, y˜t, c˜t), can
be computed via a simple traversal of the game tree. The
algorithm starts at the root of the game tree and starts visiting
the tree. Every time a node that belongs to the chance
player or to Player 2 is encountered, an action is sampled
according to the strategy c or yt, respectively. Every time
a node for Player 1 is encountered, the algorithm branches
on all possible actions and recurses. A simple linear-time
implementation is given in Algorithm 1. For every node of
Player 2 or chance player, the algorithm branches on only
one action, thus computing an external sampling gradient
estimate is significantly cheaper to compute than the exact
gradient `t1.
Algorithm 1: Efficient implementation of the external
sampling gradient estimator
Input: yt strategy for Player 2
Output: ˜`t1 unbiased gradient estimate for `t1 defined in (4)
1 ˜`t1 ← 0 ∈ R|Σ1|
2 subroutine TRAVERSEANDSAMPLE(v)
3 I ← infoset to which v belongs
4 if v is a leaf then
5 ˜`t1[σ1(v)]← u1(v)
6 else if v belongs to the chance player then
7 Sample an action a∗ ∼
(
c[(I,a)]
c[σc(I)]
)
a∈Av
8 TRAVERSEANDSAMPLE(ρ(v, a∗))
9 else if v belongs to Player 2 then
10 Sample an action a∗ ∼
(
yt[(I,a)
yt[σ2(I)]
)
a∈Av
11 TRAVERSEANDSAMPLE(ρ(v, a∗))
12 else if v belongs to Player 1 then
13 for a ∈ Av do
14 TRAVERSEANDSAMPLE(ρ(v, a))
15 TRAVERSEANDSAMPLE(r) . r is root of the game tree
16 return ˜`t1
Remark. Analogous estimators where only the chance
player’s strategy c or only Player 2’s strategy yt are sampled
are referred to as chance sampling estimator and opponent
sampling estimator, respectively. In both cases, the same
value of M˜ = ∆ (and therefore the bound in (6)) applies.
Remark. In the special case in which R1 and R2 run the
CFR regret minimization algorithm, our analysis immedi-
ately implies the correctness of external-sampling MCCFR,
chance-sampling MCCFR and opponent-sampling MCCFR,
while at the same time yielding a significant improvement
over the theoretical convergence to Nash equilibrium of
the overall algorithm: the right hand side of (6) grows as√
log(1/p) in p, compared to the O(
√
1/p) of the original
analysis of by Lanctot et al. (2009)—an exponential im-
provement.
4.2. Outcome Sampling
Let wt ∈ X be an arbitrary strategy for Player 1. Further-
more, let z˜t ∈ Z be a random variable such that for all
z ∈ Z,
Pt[z˜t = z] = wt[σ1(z)] · yt[σ2(z)] · c[σc(z)],
and let ez be defined as the vector such that ez [σ1(z)] = 1
and ez [σ] = 0 for all other σ ∈ Σ1, σ 6= σ1(z). It is a simple
exercise to prove that the random vector
˜`t
1 :=
u2(z˜
t)
wt[σ1(z˜t)]
ez˜t
is such that Et[ ˜`t1] = `
t
1 (see Appendix A for a proof). This
particular definition of ˜`t1 is called the outcome sampling
gradient estimator.
5
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Computationally, the outcome sampling gradient estimator
is cheaper than the external sampling gradient estimator.
Indeed, since wt ∈ X , one can sample z˜t by following a
random path from the root of the game tree by sampling
(from the appropriate player’s strategy) one action at each
node encountered along the way. The walk terminates as
soon as it reaches a leaf, which corresponds to z˜.
As we show in Appendix A, the value of M˜ for the outcome
sampling gradient estimator is given by
M˜ = ∆ · max
σ∈Σ1
1
wt[σ]
.
So, the high-probability bound on the saddle point gap is in-
versely proportional to the minimum entry in wt, as already
noted by Lanctot et al. (2009).
In Appendix A we show that a strategy w∗ exists, such that
w∗[σ] ≥ 1/(|Σ1|−1) for every σ ∈ Σ1. Sincew∗ guarantees
that all of the |Σ1| entries of w∗ are at least 1/(|Σ1| − 1),
we call w∗ the balanced strategy, and the corresponding
outcome sampling regret estimator the balanced outcome
sampling regret estimator. As a consequence of the above
analysis, when both players’ gradients are estimated using
the balanced outcome sampling regret estimator, with prob-
ability at least 1 − 2p the saddle point gap of the average
strategy profile (x¯, y¯) is upper bounded as
ξ(x¯, y¯) ≤ R˜
T
1 (xˆ) + R˜
T
2 (yˆ)
T
+ 2(|Σ1|+ |Σ2|)∆
√
2
T
log
1
p
.
To our knowledge, we are the first to introduce the balanced
outcome sampling gradient estimator.
The final remark of Section 4.1 applies to outcome sampling
as well.
5. Experiments
In this section we perform numerical simulations to investi-
gate the practical performance of several stochastic regret-
minimization algorithms. First, we have the MCCFR algo-
rithm instantiated with regret matching (Hart & Mas-Colell,
2000). Secondly, we instantiate two algorithms through our
framework: FTRL and OMD, both using the dilated entropy
DGF from Kroer et al. (2020), using their theoretically-
correct recursive scheme for information-set weights2. We
will show two sections of experiments, one with external
sampling, and one with balanced outcome sampling.
For each game, we try four choices of stepsize η in FTRL
and OMD: 0.1, 1, 10, 100. For each algorithm and game pair
we show only the best-performing of these four stepsizes in
the plots below. The results for all stepsizes can be found
in Appendix C. The stepsize is very important: for most
2As opposed to constant information-set weights as used nu-
merically by some past papers. Preliminary experiments with
constant weights gave worse results.
games where FTRL or OMD beats MCCFR, only the best
stepsize does so. At the same time, we did not extensively
tune stepsizes (four stepsizes increasing by a factor of 10
per choice leads to very coarse tuning), so there is room
for better tuning of these. Figuring out how to intelligently
choose, or adapt, stepsizes is an important follow-up work to
the present paper, and would likely lead to faster algorithms.
For each pair of game and algorithm we run the experiment
50 times, in order to account for variance in gradient esti-
mates. All plots show the mean performance, and each line
is surrounded by shading indicating one standard deviation
around the mean performance.
In each plot we show the number of nodes (of the game
tree) touched on the x-axis, and on the y-axis we show the
saddle-point gap. All algorithms are run until the number
of nodes touched corresponds to 50 full tree traversals (or
equivalently 25 iterations of deterministic CFR or CFR+).
We run our experiments on four different games. Below,
we summarize some key properties of the games. The full
description of each game is in Appendix B.
Leduc poker is a standard parametric benchmark game in
the EFG-solving community (Southey et al., 2005). For the
experiments we consider the largest variant of the game,
denoted Leduc13. Leduc13 uses a deck of 13 unique cards,
with two copies of each card. The game has 166,336 nodes
and 6,007 sequences per player.
Goofspiel The variant of Goofspiel (Ross, 1971) that we use
in our experiments is a two-player card game, employing
three identical decks of 4 cards each. This game has 54,421
nodes and 21,329 sequences per player.
Search is a security-inspired pursuit-evasion game. The
game is played on a graph shown in Figure 5 in Appendix B.
We consider two variants of the game, which differ on the
number k of simultaneous moves allowed before the game
ties out. Search-4 uses k = 4 and has 21,613 nodes, 2,029
defender sequences, and 52 attacker sequences. Search-
5 uses k = 5 and has 87,972 nodes, 11,830 defender se-
quences, and 69 attacker sequences. Our search game is a
zero-sum variant of the one used by Kroer et al. (2018). A
similar search game considered by Bošansky` et al. (2014)
and Bošansky` & Cˇermák (2015).
Battleship is a parametric version of a classic board game,
where two competing fleets take turns shooting at each
other (Farina et al., 2019c). The game has 732,607 nodes,
73,130 sequences for Player 1, and 253,940 sequences for
Player 2.
5.1. External Sampling
For every algorithm and game we show the exploitability
averaged over 50 runs (due to the variance in which gradient
6
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Figure 3. Performance of MCCFR, FTRL, and OMD when using the external sampling gradient estimator.
is sampled). Each line is surrounded by shading covering
one standard deviation from the mean.
Figure 3 (top left) shows the performance on Battleship with
external sampling. We see that both FTRL and OMD per-
forms better than MCCFR when using a stepsize of η = 10.
In Goofspiel (top right plot) we find that OMD performs
significantly worse than MCCFR and FTRL. MCCFR per-
forms slightly better than FTRL also. In Leduc 13 (bottom
left) we find that OMD performs significantly worse than
MCCFR and FTRL. FTRL performs slightly better than
MCCFR. Finally, in Search-4 (bottom right) we find that
OMD and MCCFR perform comparably, while FTRL per-
forms significantly better. Due to space limitations, we show
the experimental evaluation for Search-5 in Appendix C. In
Search-5 all algorithms perform comparably, with FTRL
performing slightly better than OMD and MCCFR.
Summarizing across all four games for external sampling,
we see that FTRL, either with η = 10 or η = 100, was better
than MCCFR on four out of five games (and essentially tied
on the last game), with significantly better performance in
the Search games. OMD seems to be more sensitive to step-
size, although it performs significantly better on Battleship.
5.2. Outcome Sampling
Next, we investigate the performance of balanced outcome
sampling. For that gradient estimator we performed 100
outcome samples per gradient estimate, and use the empiri-
cal mean of those 100 samples as our estimate. The reason
for this is that FTRL and OMD seem more sensitive to step-
size issues under outcome sampling, and so we investigate a
slightly more stable version of outcome sampling, while still
having the same asymptotically cheap cost. It can be shown
easily that by averaging gradient estimators, the constant M˜
required in Proposition 1 does not increase.
Due to computational time issues, we present performance
for only 10 random seeds per game in outcome sampling.
For this reason we omit performance on Search-4, which
seemed too noisy to make conclusions about. Search-4 plots
can be found in Appendix C.
Figure 4 (top left) shows the performance on Battleship with
outcome sampling. Here all algorithms perform essentially
identically, with MCCFR performing better for a while, but
then they all become similar around 3× 107 nodes touched.
In Goofspiel (top right) MCCFR performs significantly bet-
ter than both FTRL and OMD. Both FTRL and OMD were
best with η = 100, our largest stepsize. It thus seems likely
that even more aggressive stepsizes are needed in order to
get better performance in Goofspiel.
In Leduc13 (bottom left) FTRL with outcome sampling is
initially slower than MCCFR, but eventually overtakes it.
OMD is significantly worse than the other algorithms.
Finally, in Search-5 (bottom right) MCCFR performs signif-
icantly better than FTRL and OMD, although FTRL seems
to be catching up in later iterations.
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Figure 4. Performance of MCCFR, FTRL, and OMD when using the balanced outcome sampling gradient estimator.
Overall, when the outcome sampling gradient estimator
is used, MCCFR seems to perform better than FTRL and
OMD. In two out of four games it is significantly better, in
one it’s marginally better, and in one FTRL is marginally
better. We hypothesize that FTRL and OMD are much
more sensitive to stepsize issues with outcome sampling as
opposed to external sampling. This would make sense, as
the variance becomes much higher.
6. Conclusion
We introduced a new framework for constructing stochastic
regret-minimization methods for solving zero-sum games.
This framework completely decouples the choice of regret
minimizer and gradient estimator, thus allowing any regret
minimizer to be coupled with any gradient estimator. Our
framework yields a streamlined and dramatically simpler
proof of MCCFR. Furthermore, it immediately gives a sig-
nificantly stronger bound on the convergence rate of the
MCCFR algorithm, whereby with probability 1− p the re-
gret grows as O(
√
T log(1/p)) instead of O(
√
T/p) as in
the original analysis—an exponentially tighter bound. We
also instantiated stochastic variants of the FTRL and OMD
algorithms for solving zero-sum EFGs using our framework.
Extensive numerical experiments showed that it is often
possible to beat MCCFR using these algorithms, even with
a mild amount of stepsize tuning. Due to its modular na-
ture, our framework opens the door to many possible future
research questions around stochastic methods for solving
EFGs. Among the most promising are methods for control-
ling the stepsize in, for instance, FTRL or OMD, as well as
instantiating our framework with other regret minimizers.
One potential avenue for future work is to develop gradient-
estimation techniques with stronger control over the vari-
ance. In that case, it is possible to derive a variation of Propo-
sition 1 that is based on the sum of conditional variances,
an intrinsic notion of time in martingales (e.g., Blackwell
& Freedman (1973)). In particular, using the Freedman-
style (Freedman, 1975) concentration result of Bartlett et al.
(2008) for martingale difference sequences, we obtain:
Proposition 3. Let T ≥ 8, and let M and M˜ be positive
constants such that |(`t)>z| ≤ M and |( ˜`)>z| ≤ M˜ for all
times t = 1, . . . , T and all feasible points z ∈ X . Further-
more, let σ :=
√
Var[dt | ˜`1, . . . , ˜`t−1] be the square root of
the sum of conditional variances. Then, for all p ∈ (0, 1)
and all u ∈ X ,
P
[
RT (u) ≤ R˜T (u) + 4 max{σβ, (M + M˜)β2}
]
≥ 1− p,
where
β :=
√
log
(
3 log T
2p
)
.
The concentration result of Proposition 3 takes into account
the variance of the martingale difference sequences. When
the variance is low, the dominant term in the right hand side
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of the inequality is (M+M˜)β2 = O(log log T ). On the other
hand, when the variance is high (that is, σ grows as
√
T ), we
recover a bound similar to the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality
(albeit with a slightly worse polylog dependence on T ).
Finally, our framework can also be applied to more general
EFG-like problems, and thus this work also allows one to
instantiate MCCFR or other stochastic methods for new
sequential decision-making problems, for example by using
the generalizations of CFR in Farina et al. (2019a) or Farina
et al. (2019b).
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A. Proofs
A.1. Regret Guarantees when Gradient Estimators are Used
For completeness, we show a proof of Proposition 1. As mentioned, it is an application of the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality
for martingale difference sequences, which we now state (see, e.g., Theorem 3.14 of McDiarmid (1998) for a proof).
Theorem 1 (Azuma-Hoeffding inequality). Let Y1, . . . , Yn be a martingale difference sequence with ak ≤ Yk ≤ bk for each
k, for suitable constants ak, bk. Then for any τ ≥ 0,
P
[∑
Yk ≥ τ
]
≤ e−2τ2/
∑
(bk−ak)2 .
Proposition 1. Let M and M˜ be positive constants such that |(`t)>(z − z′)| ≤ M and |( ˜`)>(z − z′)| ≤ M˜ for all times
t = 1, . . . , T and all feasible points z,z′ ∈ Z. Then, for all p ∈ (0, 1) and all u ∈ Z,
P
[
RT (u) ≤ R˜T (u) + (M + M˜)
√
2T log
1
p
]
≥ 1− p.
Proof. As observed in the body, dt := (`t)>(zt − u)− ( ˜`t)>(zt − u) is a martingale difference sequence. Furthermore, at
all times t,
|dt| = |(`t)>(zt − u)− ( ˜`t)>(zt − u)|
≤ |(`t)>(zt − u)|+ |( ˜`t)>(zt − u)|
≤M + M˜,
and therefore −(M + M˜) ≤ dt ≤ (M + M˜) for each t.
Furthermore,
T∑
t=1
dt =
(
T∑
t=1
(`t)>(zt − u)
)
−
(
T∑
t=1
( ˜`t)>(zt − u)
)
= RT (u)− R˜T (u).
So, using Theorem 1, for all τ ≥ 0
P
[
RT (u) ≤ R˜T (u) + τ
]
= P
[
T∑
t=1
dt ≤ τ
]
= 1− P
[
T∑
t=1
dt ≥ τ
]
≥ 1− exp
{
− 2τ
2∑T
t=1 4(M + M˜)
2
}
= 1− exp
{
− 2τ
2
4T (M + M˜)2
}
.
Finally, substituting τ = (M + M˜)
√
2T log(1/p) yields the statement.
A.2. Properties of the Outcome Sampling Gradient Estimator
Let wt ∈ X be an arbitrary strategy for Player 1. Furthermore, let z˜t ∈ Z be a random variable such that for all z ∈ Z,
Pt[z˜t = z] = wt[σ1(z)] · yt[σ2(z)] · c[σc(z)],
and let ez be defined as the vector such that ez [σ1(z)] = 1 and ez [σ] = 0 for all other σ ∈ Σ1, σ 6= σ1(z).
Lemma 1. The random vector
˜`t
1 :=
u2(z˜
t)
wt[σ1(z˜t)]
ez˜t
is such that Et[ ˜`t1] = `
t
1.
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Proof. For all x ∈ R|Σ1|,
Et[`t1]
>x =
∑
z∈Z
P[z˜t = z] · u1(z)
wt[σ1(z)]
ez
>x
=
∑
z∈Z
u2(z) · yt[σ2(z)] · c[σc(z)] · ez
>x
=
∑
z∈Z
u2(z) · yt[σ2(z)] · c[σc(z)] · (e>z x)
=
∑
z∈Z
u2(z) · yt[σ2(z)] · c[σc(z)] · x[σ1(z)]
= u2(x,y
t, c) = `>1 x.
Since the equality holds for all x ∈ R|Σ1|, we conclude Et[ ˜`t1] = `1.
Furthermore,
Lemma 2. For all x,x′ ∈ X ,
( ˜`1)
>(x− x′) ≤ ∆ · max
σ∈Σ1
1
wt[σ]
.
Proof. Using the definition of ˜`1,
( ˜`1)
>(x− x′) = u2(z˜
t)
wt[σ1(z˜t)]
(
x[σ1(z˜
t)]− x′[σ1(z˜t)]
)
.
Since each entry of x and x′ is in the interval [0, 1], the quantity x[σ1(z˜t)]− x′[σ1(z˜t)] has absolute value in [0, 1] as well.
Hence, ∣∣∣( ˜`1)>(x− x′)∣∣∣ ≤ max
z∈Z
∣∣∣∣ u2(z)wt[σ1(z)])
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∆ · maxσ∈Σ1 1wt[σ]
as we wanted to show.
A.3. Balanced Strategy
We now describe the construction of the balanced strategy w∗. Given σ ∈ Σ1, we let Cσ be the set of information sets IinI1
such that σ1(I) = σ. Furthermore, let mσ, for σ ∈ Σ1, be the number of terminal sequences in the subtree rooted under σ;
formally, mσ is defined recursively as
mσ =

1 if Cσ = ∅;∑
I∈Cσ
∑
a∈AI
m(I,a) otherwise.
Clearly, mσ ≤ |Σ1| − 1, since the empty sequence is never terminal (assuming Player 1 acts at least once). With that, we
define w∗ such that w∗[∅] = 1 and that for all σ = (I, a) ∈ Σ1,
w∗[σ] = mσ∑
a′∈AI m(I,a′)
w∗[σ1(I)].
It is immediate to verify that w∗ is indeed a valid sequence-form strategy. Furthermore, since for all I ∈ I1, I ∈ Cσ1(I), we
have ∑
a′∈AI
m(I,a′) ≤ mσ(I).
So,
w∗[σ] ≥ mσ
mσ1(I)
w∗[σ1(I)].
By recursively expanding the definition of w∗[σ1(I)] on the right-hand side until σ1(I) = ∅, we ultimately obtain
w∗[σ] ≥ 1
m∅
≥ 1|Σ1| − 1
for all σ, as we wanted to show.
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B. Description of the Game Instances Used in the Experiments
We run our experiments on four different games, each described below.
Leduc poker is a standard benchmark in the EFG-solving community (Southey et al., 2005). Our variant, Leduc 13, has a
deck of 13 unique cards, with two copies of each card. The game consists of two rounds. In the first round, each player
places an ante of 1 in the pot and receives a single private card. A round of betting then takes place with a two-bet maximum,
with Player 1 going first. A public shared card is then dealt face up and another round of betting takes place. Again, Player 1
goes first, and there is a two-bet maximum. If one of the players has a pair with the public card, that player wins. Otherwise,
the player with the higher card wins. All bets in the first round are 1, while all bets in the second round are 2. This game has
166336 nodes and 6007 sequences per player.
Goofspiel The variant of Goofspiel (Ross, 1971) that we use in our experiments is a two-player card game, employing three
identical decks of 4 cards each. At the beginning of the game, each player receives one of the decks to use it as its own hand,
while the last deck is put face down between the players, with cards in increasing order of rank from top to bottom. Cards
from this deck will be the prizes of the game. In each round, the players privately select a card from their hand as a bet to
win the topmost card in the prize deck. The selected cards are simultaneously revealed, and the highest one wins the prize
card. In case of a tie, the prize card is discarded. Each prize card’s value is equal to its face value, and at the end of the game
the players’ score are computed as the sum of the values of the prize cards they have won. This game has 54421 nodes and
21329 sequences per player.
Search is a security-inspired pursuit-evasion game. The game is played on the graph shown in Figure 5.
P1 P2
S
5
10
3
Figure 5. The graph on which the search game is played.
It is a simultaneous-move game (which can be modeled as a turn-taking EFG with appropriately chosen information sets).
The defender controls two patrols that can each move within their respective shaded areas (labeled P1 and P2). At each
time step the controller chooses a move for both patrols. The attacker is always at a single node on the graph, initially the
leftmost node labeled S. The attacker can move freely to any adjacent node (except at patrolled nodes, the attacker cannot
move from a patrolled node to another patrolled node). The attacker can also choose to wait in place for a time step in order
to clean up their traces. If a patrol visits a node that was previously visited by the attacker, and the attacker did not wait to
clean up their traces, they can see that the attacker was there. If the attacker reaches any of the rightmost nodes they receive
the respective payoff at the node (5, 10, or 3, respectively). If the attacker and any patrol are on the same node at any time
step, the attacker is captured, which leads to a payoff of −1 for the attacker and a payoff of 1 for the defender. Finally, the
game times out after k simultaneous moves, in which case both players defender receive payoffs 0. Search-4 (Search-5) has
21613 (87,927) nodes, 2029 (11,830) defender sequences, and 52 (69) attacker sequences.
Our search game is a zero-sum variant of the one used by Kroer et al. (2018). A similar search game considered by Bošansky`
et al. (2014) and Bošansky` & Cˇermák (2015).
Battleship is a parametric version of a classic board game, where two competing fleets take turns shooting at each
other (Farina et al., 2019c). At the beginning of the game, the players take turns at secretly placing a set of ships on separate
grids (one for each player) of size 3× 2. Each ship has size 2 (measured in terms of contiguous grid cells) and a value of 1,
and must be placed so that all the cells that make up the ship are fully contained within each player’s grids and do not overlap
with any other ship that the player has already positioned on the grid. After all ships have been placed. the players take turns
at firing at their opponent. Ships that have been hit at all their cells are considered sunk. The game continues until either one
player has sunk all of the opponent’s ships, or each player has completed r shots. At the end of the game, each player’s
payoff is calculated as the sum of the values of the opponent’s ships that were sunk, minus the sum of the values of ships
which that player has lost. The game has 732607 nodes, 73130 sequences for player 1, and 253940 sequences for player 2.
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C. Additional Experimental Results
C.1. External Sampling
The Search-5 plot omitted from the main paper is shown here.
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Figure 6. Performance of MCCFR, FTRL, and OMD with external sampling on Search-5.
Figures 7 through 11 show the performance of FTRL and OMD for all four stepsizes that we tried on each game:
η = 0.1, 1, 10, 100.
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
Number of nodes touched (×107)
100
Sa
dd
le
-p
oi
nt
ga
p
Battleship, external sampling, 50 seeds
MCCFR
FTRL (η = 0.1)
FTRL (η = 1)
FTRL (η = 10)
FTRL (η = 100)
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
Number of nodes touched (×107)
100
Sa
dd
le
-p
oi
nt
ga
p
Battleship, external sampling, 50 seeds
MCCFR
OMD (η = 0.1)
OMD (η = 1)
OMD (η = 10)
OMD (η = 100)
Figure 7. Performance of FTRL and OMD with four stepsizes on Battleship with external sampling. MCCFR shown for reference
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Figure 8. Performance of FTRL and OMD with four stepsizes on Goofspiel with external sampling. MCCFR shown for reference
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Figure 9. Performance of FTRL and OMD with four stepsizes on Leduc 13 with external sampling. MCCFR shown for reference
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Figure 10. Performance of FTRL and OMD with four stepsizes on Search-4 with external sampling. MCCFR shown for reference
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Figure 11. Performance of FTRL and OMD with four stepsizes on Search-5 with external sampling. MCCFR shown for reference
C.2. Balanced Outcome Sampling
The Search-4 plot omitted from the main paper is shown here.
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Figure 12. Performance of MCCFR, FTRL, and OMD with outcome sampling on Search-4.
Figure 12 shows the performance on Search-4 and Search-5 with outcome sampling. In Search-4 we find that MCCFR
performs better than FTRL and OMD, though FTRL is comparable at later iterations.
Figures 13 through 17 show the performance of FTRL and OMD with outcome sampling for all four stepsizes that we tried
on each game: η = 0.1, 1, 10, 100.
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Figure 13. Performance of FTRL and OMD with four stepsizes on Battleship with outcome sampling. MCCFR shown for reference
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Figure 14. Performance of FTRL and OMD with four stepsizes on Goofspiel with outcome sampling. MCCFR shown for reference
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Figure 15. Performance of FTRL and OMD with four stepsizes on Leduc 13 with outcome sampling. MCCFR shown for reference
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Figure 16. Performance of FTRL and OMD with four stepsizes on Search-4 with outcome sampling. MCCFR shown for reference
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Figure 17. Performance of FTRL and OMD with four stepsizes on Search-5 with outcome sampling. MCCFR shown for reference
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